Epistemic Freedom
Epistemic freedom is the freedom to affirm any one of several incompatible propositions without risk of being wrong.[2] We sometimes have this freedom, strange as it seems, and our having it sheds ...
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moral psychology
What Happens When Someone Acts?
A familiar answer goes like this. There is something that the agent wants, and there is an action that he believes conducive to its attainment. His desire for the end, and his belief in the action ...
Read ItThe Story of Rational Action
Decision theory comprises, first, a mathematical formalization of the relations among value, belief, and preference; and second, a set of prescriptions for rational preference. Both aspects of the ...
Read ItThe Guise of the Good
The agent portrayed in much philosophy of action is, let’s face it, a square. He does nothing intentionally unless he regards it or its consequences as desirable. The reason is that he acts intenti...
Read ItThe Possibility of Practical Reason
In this chapter I argue that a widely recognized right to die would have the paradoxical effect of harming some people who never exercise it as well as some who exercise it and are better off for d...
Read ItHow to Share an Intention
Literally sharing a single intention is easier than it seems—and fortunately so, since it seems quite impossible, at least to some philosophers. Philosophical puzzlement about how to share an inte...
Read ItDeciding How to Decide
By “deciding how to decide”, I mean using practical reasoning to regulate one’s principles of practical reasoning. David Gauthier has suggested that deciding how to decide is something that every r...
Read ItOn the Aim of Belief
Introduction There are several reasons for being interested in the fact—if it is a fact—that belief aims at the truth. I am going to argue that it’s a fact. But first, the reasons for taking an i...
Read ItThe Way of the Wanton
In his 1970 paper “How is Weakness of the Will Possible?” Donald Davidson introduced his solution to the philosophical problem of akrasia by framing it as a problem about the self: [2] The image w...
Read ItWhat Good is a Will?
Introduction As a philosopher of action, I might be expected to believe that the will is a good thing. Actually, I believe that the will is a great thing—awesome, in fact. But I’m not thereby comm...
Read ItTime for Action
Prologue: “All Out Judgment” [T]he event whose occurrence makes ‘I turned on the light’ true cannot be called the object, however intentional, of ‘I wanted to turn on the light’. If I turned on t...
Read ItA Note on Practical Knowledge
Heavier-than-air flying machines are impossible. – Lord Kelvin, president of the Royal Society, 1895 Peter Pan sprinkles fairy dust on Wendy, Michael, and John, saying, “Now you can fly, but only...
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